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Abstract
Fifteenth-century Thomists were deeply involved in the debate over the nature 
and mode of universals, which was at the core of the so-called Wegestreit in the 
late Middle Ages. Their solutions were intended to fill some theoretical gaps 
left by Thomas Aquinas, who, although he touched on the theme in his work, 
did not leave a systematic treatment of the topic. This paper investigates the 
opinions of the major Thomist masters of Cologne as found in their Com-
mentaries on the De ente et essentia and in other sources. It aims to bring into 
focus the strategies by which those masters ‘canonized’ Aquinas’s doctrine, 
developing their own views in the process and differentiating them from the 
views of their institutional rivals.
In his late fifteenth-century commentary on the Ars vetus, composed 
“according to the doctrine of the Moderns,” Ingolstadt master 
Johannes Parreudt (fl. 1495) noted with a certain irony that the opin-
ions of many famous masters on the nature of universals were so 
diverse that, as he says, “I could almost compose a massive book on 
universals, if I wanted to explicate all the opinions of those who 
universalize.”1 Prudently, the nominalist then declared that he would 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the meeting Thomas d’Aquin et la 
querelle des universaux, Paris 18-19 February 2011, as part of the French-German research 
project THOM [ANR-DFG]. I wish to thank Peter Eardley for his assistance in revising 
the English text.
1. Cf. JOHANNES PARREUDT, Textus veteris artis […] Item exercitata circa hoc secundum 
doctrinam Modernorum collecta et bene emendata per venerabilem virum magistrum 
Johannem Parreudt […], ed. H. HOLCZEL, Nürnberg, J. Schonsperger 1502 [hereafter 
abbreviated as: Textus veteris artis], f. a 2v-a 3r: “Quoddam est universale in essendo, 
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avoid “setting a trap before his own feet” by attempting to address 
this complex state of affairs.2 In a similarly polemical vein, other 
nominalists at the same university accused their realist rivals of having 
such disparate opinions that “there would hardly have been two of 
them who maintained the same position about universals.”3 Such 
accusations, especially from admittedly hostile sources, should come 
as no great surprise. As has been well documented by historians work-
ing on the period, the intellectual environment at many late-medieval 
universities, especially in Central Europe, was characterized by the 
committment of masters to different, and often competing schools of 
thought. The practice of fifteenth-century philosophy and theology, 
in particular, was famous for the stances adopted by the followers 
of different institutionalized viae, each of them leaning on the author-
ity of one or another of the great masters from the thirteenth or 
fourteenth centuries.4 One might say that scholarly production was 
scilicet quod in sua essentia et natura commune est pluribus individuis. Et an illud sit in 
rerum natura, est dubium apud plures. […] Et quasi unum magnum librum de univer-
salibus componere possem, si omnia motiva illorum universalizantium in medium 
adducere vellem.” On Johannes Parreudt, see C. VON PRANTL, “Parreut, Johann,” in: 
Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, Bd. 25, Leipzig 1887, p. 183, with other references to 
Prantl’s studies; and M.J.F.M. HOENEN, “‘Secundum vocem concordare, sensu tamen 
discrepare’. Der Streit um die Deutung des Aristoteles an der Universität Ingolstadt im 
späten 15. und frühen 16. Jahrhundert,” in: A. FIDORA – J. FRIED – M. LUTZ-BACHMANN 
– L. SCHORN-SCHÜTTE (eds.), Politischer Aristotelismus und Religion in Mittelalter und 
Früher Neuzeit, Berlin 2007, pp. 67-87, esp. 72-73 and 79-86. For a brief sketch of late 
medieval logic and its influence on early modern philosophy, see also A. SEIFERT, Logik 
zwischen Scholastik und Humanismus. Das Kommentarwerk Johann Ecks, München 1978, 
chap. 2, esp. pp. 16-17 with notes on pp. 106-108. 
2. Cf. JOHANNES PARREUDT, Textus veteris artis, f. a 3r: “Sed fortasse mihiipsi laqueum 
(quo me in errores involverem) ante pedes ponerem.” 
3. See F. EHRLE, Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes 
Alexanders V. Ein Beitrag zur Scheidung der Schulen in der Scholastik des vierzehnten 
Jahrhunderts und zur Geschichte des Wegestreites, Münster 1925, pp. 331-332, “Ingolstäd-
ter Schriftstücke über den Wegestreit (Wende des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts)”: “At 
Antiqui nullam habent neque habere possunt aliquam necessitantem rationem ponendi 
universalis realis, sed soli auctoritati innituntur. Praeterea erroneam esse eorum posi-
tionem, ostenditur ex eo quod fere omnes sunt varii inter se, ut non facile duos reperias, 
qui de universali idem sentient.” 
4. On the disputes between nominalists and realists, and also between the different 
schools belonging to the same via, such as Thomists and Albertists, with special reference 
to the German universities, see: M.J.F.M. HOENEN, “Via antiqua and via moderna in the 
fifteenth century: doctrinal, institutional, and church political factors in the Wegestreit,” 
in: R.L. FRIEDMAN – L. O. NIELSEN (eds.), The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern 
Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700, Dordrecht 2003, pp. 9-36; P. RUTTEN, “Duae 
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therefore intrinsically bound to a specific institution — a university, 
or more specifically, a college (bursa). Thinking, in short, had an 
immediate institutional and party affiliation.5 A doctrinal position 
was tout court also a positioning towards other competing currents. 
Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that a fifteenth-century 
philosophical position was often also a political position. 
Against this background, it becomes clear that the various doctrines 
and opinions on one debated topic were essentially contextual: they 
could change, or at least take on different nuances, according to the 
institutional context in which they were expressed. That is, their 
content was bound to the reciprocal positioning of the masters who 
articulated them. The practical results of this situation were, thus, a 
diversification and multiplication of positions, not only with refer-
ence to competing viae — via antiqua against via moderna — but also 
between different currents within each of the two viae, albeit acting 
under different institutional circumstances. This diversity of views 
was particularly evident, as we will establish below, on the question 
of universals, which was foundational to the division between nomi-
nalists and realists, and which became, for various reasons, a central 
subject of debate.6
opiniones probabiles: Der Kölner Wegestreit und seine Verbreitung an den Universitäten 
des 15. Jahrhunderts,” in: L. CESALLI – N. GERMANN – M.J.F.M. HOENEN (eds.), 
University, Council, City. Intellectual Culture on the Rhine (1300-1550), Turnhout 2007, 
pp. 113-134; M.J.F.M. HOENEN, “Philosophie und Theologie im 15. Jahrhundert. Die 
Universität Freiburg und der Wegestreit,” in: D. MERTENS (ed.), Von der hohen Schule 
zur Universität der Neuzeit, Freiburg im Breisgau 2007, pp. 67-91. See also G. RITTER’s 
classical: Via antiqua und via moderna auf den deutschen Universitäten des XV. Jahrhun-
derts, Heidelberg 1922 (2nd ed. Darmstadt 1963) and A.L. GABRIEL, “‘Via antiqua’ and 
‘via moderna’ and the Migration of Paris Students and Masters to the German Universi-
ties in the Fifteenth Century,” in: A. ZIMMERMANN (ed.), Antiqui und Moderni. Tradi-
tionsbewußtsein und Fortschrittsbewußtsein im späteren Mittelalter, Berlin / New York 1974, 
pp. 439-483. 
5. Cf. HOENEN, “Via antiqua and via moderna.” 
6. This fact has already been pointed out by many scholars; cf. for example RITTER, 
Via antiqua, p. 69. One of the reasons for this fact, according to Zenon Kaluza, was “la 
place considérable que les universaux occupent dans l’ensemble du savoir philosophique 
et du savoir scientifique tout court.” See Z. KALUZA, Les querelles doctrinales à Paris. 
Nominalistes et réalistes aux confins du XIVe et du XVe siècles, Bergamo 1988, here p. 23. 
Maarten Hoenen has clearly shown how the question about the nature of universals 
became at the beginning of the 15th century a central topic in the debate on the relation 
between theology and philosophy, which was really at stake in the Wegestreit; cf. M.J.F.M. 
HOENEN, “Zurück zu Autorität und Tradition. Geistesgeschichtliche Hintergründe des 
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Such an apparent lack of cohesion among the various realist schools 
lay, at least partly, behind the above-mentioned Ingolstadt nominal-
ists’ criticism. Moreover, the nominalists had no higher opinion of 
the individual schools within the via antiqua. In the above-mentioned 
Ingolstadt document, for example, the Thomist Petrus Schwarz 
(c. 1435 - c. 1483) denounced other Thomists for what he perceived 
as their misunderstanding of Thomas’s doctrine on universals.7 Such 
disagreement within the realist school merely confirmed for the 
nominalists that their adversaries were confused with respect to the 
question of universals. Jodocus Trutfetter (c. 1460-1519), a famous 
nominalist working in Erfurt at the end of the fifteenth century, 
while discussing the notion of verbum mentis in his Summa in totam 
physicen, summarized the nominalist attitude when he stated: “There 
is such diversity among the Thomists about its quiddity [sc. of the 
verbum mentis], that I would finish my paper and my time before 
I would be able to set out the opinions of all those people.”8 
As we will see, nominalist remarks, such as the foregoing, were not 
merely rhetorical. Rather, they were in fact well rooted in a funda-
mental division on the realist side, and also amongst Thomists, who 
disagreed over how exactly to interpret Aquinas’s texts. In the 
fifteenth century, however, the debate between the various factions of 
the realist school went beyond mere differences in exegesis, taking on 
Traditionalismus an den spätmittelalterlichen Universitäten,” in: J.A. AERTSEN – 
M. PICKAVÉ (eds.), „Herbst des Mittelalters“? Fragen zur Bewertung des 14. und 15. Jahr-
hunderts, Berlin / New York 2004, pp. 133-146. 
7. Cf. EHRLE, Der Sentenzenkommentar, p. 332: “Nam iam longe aliter de universali 
sentient quam ante adventum fratris Petri Schwarcz, qui eos in aliam traduxit opinionem, 
et publice reprehendit eorum errorem et qui ita ut Antiqui sentirent, eos dixit non intel-
ligere scripta sancti Thomae.” 
8. JODOCUS TRUTFETTER, Summa in totam physicen, hoc est philosophiam naturalem, 
conformiter siquidem verae sophiae, quae est Theologia, ed. M. MALER, Erfurt 1514, f. Ff Ir: 
“Immo de huius [scil. verbi mentis] quiditate tanta est etiam inter Thomistas diversitas 
quod prius me charta et dies deficerent, quam omnium sententias recenserem.” On the 
academic activity and production of the nominalist Master at the Erfurter University, 
which was traditionally devoted to the via moderna, cf. E. KLEINEIDAM, Universitas Studii 
Erffordensis. Überblick über die Geschichte der Universität Erfurt im Mittelalter (1392-1521), 
Teil II: 1460-1521, Leipzig 1969, esp. pp. 143 ff., 292-294; W. URBAN, “Die ‘via mod-
erna’ an der Universität Erfurt,” in: H.A. OBERMAN (ed.), Gregor von Rimini. Werk und 
Wirkung bis zur Reformation, Berlin / New York 1981, pp. 311-330; J. PILVOUSEK, “Jodo-
cus Trutfetter (1460-1519) und der Erfurter Nominalismus,” in: D. VON DER PFORDTEN 
(ed.), Große Denker Erfurts und der Erfurter Universität, Göttingen 2002, pp. 96-117. 
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new and substantial implications in the context of the academic 
Wegestreit. 
In order to bring out the argumentative strategies of the Thomists’ 
account of universals, I will concentrate on the local context which 
contributed to shaping them. Cologne will provide the setting for my 
inquiry. Historical circumstances as well as interesting personalities 
contributed to making its academic milieu a centre of lively dispute 
which had, in its institutionalised form, a strong influence on other 
universities within Central Europe and which may therefore serve, for 
the modern researcher, as a paradigmatic case study.9
1. The Legacy of Thomas Aquinas
As is commonly known, Aquinas left no exhaustive treatise on uni-
versals, touching on this topic only indirectly. His most comprehen-
sive treatment of the problem, i.e., in chapter 3 of his De ente et 
essentia, was in fact designed to describe the question of the relation-
ship between essence in composite beings and the “ratio generis, spe-
ciei et differentiae.” He did not, as such, address the traditional sets 
of questions on the topic of universals.10 Of course the text furnished 
9. On the history of the University of Cologne in the fifteenth century, with the birth 
of the Bursae and the spread of the so-called Wegestreit, cf. E. MEUTHEN, Kölner Univer-
sitätsgeschichte, Band I: Die alte Universität, Köln / Wien 1988, esp. pp. 52-202. More 
specifically, on the Bursae in Cologne see the classic work by G.-R. TEWES, Die Bursen 
der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts, Köln 1993. The academic 
and collegial model of the University of Cologne had an important influence upon other 
universities, such as Leuven, Heidelberg, Leipzig, Copenhagen, Greifswald and Cracow, 
as is now well-established: see for example MEUTHEN, Kölner Universitätsgeschichte, 
pp. 176-178, 194-202; TEWES, Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät, pp. 395-664; ID., 
“Die Erfurter Nominalisten und ihre thomistischen Widersacher in Köln, Leipzig und 
Wittenberg. Ein Beitrag zum deutschen Humanismus am Vorabend der Reformation,” 
in: A. SPEER (ed.), Die Bibliotheca Amploniana. Ihre Bedeutung im Spannungsfeld von 
Aristotelismus, Nominalismus und Humanismus, Berlin / New York 1995, pp. 447-488, 
esp. pp. 450-45. On the ‘recruitment area’ of the university of Cologne, see for example 
R.C. SCHWINGES, “On Recruitment in German Universities from the Fourteenth to Six-
teenth Centuries,” in: W.J. COURTENAY – J. MIETHKE (eds.), Universities and Schooling 
in Medieval Society, Leiden / Boston / Köln 2000, pp. 32-48, esp. 39. 
10. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, De ente et essentia, 3, ed. Leon. 43, Roma 1976, pp. 374-
375. Jorge Gracia has maintained that the very move of Thomas in the De ente et essentia, 
with reference to the question of universals, consisted first of all in rejecting his predeces-
sors’ traditional presuppositions and formulations of the problem; see J.J.E. GRACIA, “Cut-
ting the Gordian Knot of Ontology: Thomas’s Solution to the Problem of Universals,” in: 
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clearly the idea that the ratio universalis occurs to humans only 
according to the being that it has in the intellect.11 Still, Aquinas’s 
doctrine concerning essence-as-predicable and essence-as-universal has 
raised some doubts and is debated even today.12 It has been pointed 
out by recent scholars that some ambiguities contained in the early 
work (for example concerning the nature of the relation between 
essence as such and its being in individuals or in the intellect)13 disap-
peared in the later works of Thomas, where he maintained a gnoseo-
logical understanding of essences considered absolutely, thus subsum-
ing them under the category of universals.14 Other modern scholars 
have argued, in contrast, that Thomas supported a coherent gnoseo-
logical comprehension of universality and predicability of the essences 
from the De ente et essentia on throughout his entire career.15 Also 
certain passages from other works — such as that found in his 
D.M. GALLAGHER (ed.), Thomas Aquinas and His Legacy, Washington D.C 1994, 
pp. 16-36. On chapter 3 of the De ente et essentia, and more generally on Aquinas’s doctrine 
of universals, see also J. OWENS, “Common Nature: A Point of Comparison Between 
Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics,” in: Mediaeval Studies 19 (1957), pp. 1-14; A. DE 
LIBERA, La querelle des universaux. De Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge, Paris 1996, 
pp. 262-283; D.L. BLACK, “Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna,” in: 
Mediaeval Studies 61 (1999), pp. 45-79; G. GALLUZZO, “Aquinas on Common Nature and 
Universals,” in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 71 (2004), pp. 131-171. 
11. Cfr. THOMAS AQUINAS, De ente et essentia, 3, pp. 374-375, 88-99. 
12. Giorgio Pini has pointed out the ambiguities posed by Thomas’s De ente et essen-
tia. According to Pini, in this early work Aquinas distinguished, in a way different from 
both the tradition and his own later views, between the universality of an essence and its 
predicability, and with that he guaranteed an ontological relationship between essence 
itself and reality; see G. PINI, “Absoluta consideratio naturae: Tommaso d’Aquino e la 
dottrina avicenniana dell’essenza,” in: Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 
15 (2004), pp. 387-438. Also Alain de Libera detected the same ambiguity in the doctrine 
of the De ente et essentia, where Thomas, according to the scholar, was “ni réaliste ni 
conceptualiste”; see DE LIBERA, La querelle des universaux, p. 283.  
13. On this point, see also GALLUZZO, “Aquinas on common nature,” pp. 136 ff. 
14. Cf. PINI, “Absoluta consideratio naturae,” esp. pp. 427 ff. A slightly different inter-
pretation of the role played by the essence as absolutely considered, or as “indifferent” – in 
Avicennian sense – in later works of Thomas, such as the Sentencia libri De anima or the 
Summa theologiae, is provided by Galluzzo, “Aquinas on common nature,” esp. 
pp. 164-171. 
15. This opinion has been recently held by Pasquale Porro in his talk “Indifferenza e 
predicabilità delle essenze in Tommaso d’Aquino (o Tommaso d’Aquino sul numero 6)” 
in the context of the meeting Thomas d’Aquin et la querelle des universaux, Paris 18-
19 February 2011. Porro rejects the idea that in the De ente et essentia there is a real dif-
ferentiation or disjunction between universality and predicability as two features respec-
tively pertaining to the intellectual apprehension of a thing and to the thing itself; on the 
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Sentences commentary, where Thomas gave, quite traditionally, a 
threefold characterization of the universal (i.e., in itself, as instanti-
ated in an individual, and as a universal concept in the mind),16 or 
the passage in his commentary on the De anima where he mentioned 
the natura communis with reference to universals17 — certainly left 
considerable scope for discussion to his successors on the topic of 
universals.18
Although late medieval Thomists seem not to have perceived that 
this topic was a relevant exegetical problem from a perspective inter-
nal to the works of their master,19 it is nonetheless clear that their 
reworking of Thomas’s opinion on universals grew in and thanks to 
a substantial gap. That is, the doctrine of universals, insofar as it 
assumed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries a better articulated 
contrary, he argues that according to Thomas both the universality and the predicability 
of an essence clearly depend on the mediation of an intellectual act. 
16. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, II, dist. 3, quaest. 3, 
art. 2, ed. P. MANDONNET, Paris 1929, p. 117. On this text, see M. BORGO, “Universals 
and the Trinity: Aquinas’s Commentary on Book I of Peter Lombard’s Sentences,” in: 
Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 18 (2007), pp. 315-342, here p. 319. 
17. Cf. for example THOMAS AQUINAS, Sentencia libri De anima, II, 12, ed. Leon. 
45.1, Roma 1984, pp. 115-116, 96-121: “[…] considerandum est quod universale potest 
accipi dupliciter: uno modo potest dici universale ipsa natura communis, prout subiacet 
intentioni universalitatis, alio modo secundum se […]. Ipsa autem natura cui advenit 
intentio universalitatis, puta natura hominis, habet duplex esse: unum quidem materiale, 
secundum quod est in materia naturali; aliud autem immateriale, secundum quod est in 
intellectu. Secundum igitur quod habet esse in materia naturali, non potest ei advenire 
intentio universalitatis, quia per materiam individuatur; advenit igitur ei universalitatis 
intentio, secundum quod abstrahitur a materia individuali”. To be clear: I am not con-
cerned here with the problems of Thomas’s own characterization of the notion of com-
mon nature, nor with his reference to the doctrine of universals, which, as mentioned, 
still puzzle modern scholars.  
18. Cf. DE LIBERA, La querelle des universaux, p. 283.  
19. In this sense we can consider the Concordantiae of the Italian Dominican Peter of 
Bergamo (d. 1482), which served as an important instrument in the process of the con-
stitution, stabilization and legitimation of Aquinas’s authority in the fifteenth century. As 
they recollected and solved the presumed contradictions internal to Thomas’s works, these 
Concordantiae are witnesses to the exegetical problems concerning the holy doctor’s pro-
duction at that time. Now, in the version of the Concordantiae enlarged by Petrus’s dis-
ciple Ambrosius de Alemania, 4 concordances are devoted to the entry “universale”: a 
quite small number, if compared for example with the 43 devoted to “anima,” the 32 
dedicated to “intellectus,” the 16 related to “scientia” and the 22 devoted to “forma.” For 
the entries related to “universale” cf. PETRUS A BERGOMO, Concordantiae Textuum discor-
dantium Divi Thomae Aquinatis, Firenze 1982 (editio phototypica), p. 553, n. 1194-
1197A. 
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and complete form, went beyond Aquinas’s thought. In a certain 
sense, it aimed to fill, for different reasons, what was perceived as a 
doctrinal incompleteness or lack of systematic coherence. One line of 
development of the topic was conveyed, for example, by treatises or 
questions on intentions and intentionality. These seem to constitute 
a quite independent genre, which found their principal source in the 
works of Hervaeus Natalis, and which followed a doctrinal vein that 
developed Thomas’s reflections.20 Moreover, a significant number of 
Thomistic pseudepigrapha on universals circulated in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries.21 Such works limited themselves in some cases 
to the content of the De ente et essentia; in other cases, however, they 
enlarged its doctrinal scope by discussing a broader spectrum of logi-
cal questions, thus also incorporating, for example, passages from 
Albert the Great.22 Despite the differences in style and intention, 
however, one can still recognize in these works a typical twofold asser-
tion according to which the universal in act, or actualiter, is in the 
soul or depends on the soul, whereas the universal in potency, or 
aptitudinaliter, is an extra-mental thing.23 These later Thomistic 
20. Cf. P.M. TAVUZZI, “Hervaeus Natalis and the philosophical logic of the Thomism 
of the Renaissance,” in: Doctor communis: Acta et Commentationes Pontificiae Academiae 
Romanae S. Thomae Aquinatis 45 (1992), pp. 132-152. Concerning Hervaeus’ Treatise 
De secundis intentionibus, cf. J.P. DOYLE, A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323), 
the Doctor Perspicacissimus, On Second Intentions. Vol. 1: An English Translation & Vol. 2: 
A Latin Edition, Milwaukee 2008. Also Gerard de Monte wrote a treatise on second 
intentions, which is transmitted in a fifteenth-century manuscript: Basel, Universitätsbib-
liothek, A X 67, ff. 94r-106vb. The text was copied by friar Casper Wittolff in Cologne, 
as is said in the colophon of the text: “Explicit tractatus de secundis intentionibus mag-
istri gerhardi de monte per me fratrem Casper wittolff in colonia” (f. 106vb). For a brief 
presentation of the treatise see G. MEERSSEMAN, “Eine weitere Schrift Gerhards de 
Monte,” in: Jahrbuch des kölnischen Geschichtsvereins 19 (1937), pp. 128-132. Concerning 
the manuscript, see also C.H. LOHR, Aristotelica Helvetica: Catalogus codicum Latinorum 
in bibliothecis Confederationis Helveticae asservatorum quibus versiones expositionesque 
operum Aristotelis continentur, Freiburg 1994, p. 19. 
21. Cf. the so-called Treatise Universale esse: Tractatus de Universalibus attribuito a San 
Tommaso d’Aquino, ed. C. Ottaviano, Roma 1932; the so-called Treatise Circa and the 
Treatise Quoniam sicut dicit in: THOMAS AQUINAS, Opuscula Omnia, tomus V, 
Opuscula Spuria, ed. P. MANDONNET, Paris 1927, pp. 383-391 and 392-398; and the 
so-called Treatise Quoniam secundum Philosophum: W. SENKO, “Pseudo-Aegidii Romani 
Tractatus de universalibus, ad fidem codicum manuscriptorum,” in: Mediaevalia 
Philosophica Polonorum 14 (1970), pp. 55-86. 
22. See for example the Treatise Universale esse, pp. 56-57. 
23. Cf. for example ibid., p. 55 and the Treatise Circa, p. 384. 
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doctrines on universals thus found an invariable core in the belief that 
the true universal is in the mind, namely the concept, which repre-
sents the plurality of real individuals through its similarity with them. 
Regardless of how this doctrine was expressed, it was well rooted in 
the texts of Thomas. Moreover, the assertion that the ratio univer-
salitatis properly corresponds to a nature “secundum esse quod habet 
in intellectu” was usually backed up by the authority of the ancients 
— Aristotle, Boethius, Avicenna, Averroes — most of whom had also 
been utilized by Aquinas.24 
By claiming that the proper essence of universals was their exist-
ence in the intellect, the Thomists made the gnoseological aspect a 
central feature of the problem itself. Indeed, one of the main rework-
ings of Thomas’s statements on universals was related to the broader 
field of the theory of cognition, not only to that of logic. Not only 
in their commentaries on the De anima, but also when commenting 
on the Logica vetus or the De ente et essentia, the Thomists were faced 
with questions concerning the intellectual process of the production 
of universals. They discussed, for example, the various modes of 
abstraction, the relationship between the species and the intention 
and the nature of the verbum mentis. The main problem was, there-
fore, as is evident, the necessity of defining the very nature of this 
intellectual universal, and, moreover, of stating its relationship to the 
object to which it refers. 
But this last question was arguably related to more traditional 
inquiries about the various modes in which essences can be thought 
and predicated and in which universals can exist — ante rem, in re 
and post rem: a type of inquiry to which Thomas had not really com-
mitted himself. And it was just in this field that one finds two 
dominant positions being maintained: one inclining more towards a 
realist position, the other tending towards a conceptualist one. 
As we shall see, the Cologne masters in particular strategically oper-
ated within this dual framework, emphasizing one aspect or the other, 
24. See for example classical loci in THOMAS AQUINAS, De ente et essentia, 3, p. 375, 
99-102, where the master mentions Averroes and Avicenna, or in ID., Sentencia libri De 
anima, I, 1, p. 7, 211 ff., where Thomas comments the Aristotelian sentence according 
to which “animal autem universale aut nichil est aut posterius.” 
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depending on whom they were arguing against and what literary 
genre they were using.
2. Thomistic Commentaries on the De ente et essentia
In order to analyze some important sources belonging to the Cologne 
milieu, we might begin with some commentaries on the De ente et 
essentia by two of the most prominent secular masters of the Thom-
istic Bursa Montana: Henry of Gorkum (c. 1378-1431), the founder 
of the College, and Gerard de Monte (c. 1400-1480).25 In contrast 
to their commentaries on Aristotle, which were related to their 
curricular academic teaching in the Faculty of Arts, their commentar-
ies on the De ente et essentia were most probably employed inside the 
Bursa.26 This was the case with Henry’s Positiones metaphysicales on 
Thomas’s De ente et essentia, printed in Cologne in 1502 by Heinrich 
Quentell.27 As stated in the heading and in the colophon of the 
25. The role of these figures in the Cologne landscape is well outlined by MEUTHEN, 
Kölner Universitätsgeschichte, and TEWES, Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät. On the 
Cologne Thomism, see also H.J.M.J. GORIS, “Thomism in Fifteenth-Century Germany,” 
in: M. BOSE – P. VAN GEEST – H. J. M. J. GORIS (eds.), Aquinas as Authority, Leuven 
2002, pp. 1-24. On Henry of Gorkum, the Thomist master of the Bursa Montana, see 
A.G. WEILER, Heinrich von Gorkum († 1431). Seine Stellung in der Philosophie und der 
Theologie des Spätmittelalters, Hilversum / Einsiedeln / Zürich / Köln 1962; on Gerard de 
Monte and his quarrel with Heymericus de Campo, see G. MEERSSEMAN, Geschichte des 
Albertismus: Heft II. Die ersten Kölner Kontroversen, Roma 1935 and M.J.F.M. HOENEN, 
“Comment lire les grands maîtres? Gérard de Monte, Heymeric de Campo et la question 
de l’accord entre Albert le Grand et Thomas d’Aquin (1456),” in: Revue Thomiste 108 
(2008), pp. 105-130. 
26. Classic studies on the De ente et essentia and its commentary tradition are: 
M. GRABMANN, “Die Schrift ‘De ente et essentia’ und die Seinsmetaphysik des heiligen 
Thomas von Aquin,” in: ID., Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte 
der Scholastik und Mystik, Bd. 1, München 1926, pp. 314-331; ID., “De commentariis in 
opusculum S. Thomae Aquinatis De ente et essentia,” in: Acta Pontificiae Academiae 
Romanae 5 (1938), pp. 7-20; K. FECKES, “Das Opusculum des hl. Thomas von Aquin 
‘De ente et essentia’ im Lichte seiner Kommentare,” in: A. LANG – J. LECHNER – 
M. SCHMAUS (eds.), Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters. Studien und Texte Martin Grab-
mann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet, 1. Halb-
band, Münster i. W. 1935, pp. 667-681. See also W. SENKO, “Les commentaires anon-
ymes du XVe siècle sur le ‘De ente et essentia’ de S. Thomas d’Aquin,” in: Mediaevalia 
Philosophica Polonorum 3 (1959), pp. 7-16. 
27. Cf. Quaestiones compendiosae ex congerie positionum metaphysicalium magistri 
Henrici de Gorynchem, Gymnasy Montis insignis Achademiae Coloniensis primi gymnasiar-
chae, haud parvo conamine traductae, ac tandem compendio doctoris sancti De quidditatibus 
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manuscript, the text is composed of several Quaestiones compendiosae 
chosen from his collection of “metaphysical positions,” which were 
almost certainly discussed by Henry in the first decades of the fif-
teenth century. With the printed text, however, we are dealing with 
a compendium that was prepared by one of the masters of the Bursa 
Montana — possibly by the other famous Thomist at the Bursa 
Lambertus de Monte (1430/1435-1499)28 — towards the end of the 
century. The text is intended for those students who approached “first 
philosophy” after having devoted themselves to the “physical disci-
plines.” As founder of the Thomistic Gymnasium, Henry’s position 
was selected as a point of reference, and also judged as “consistent” 
with the “disputative process of the masters of the Gymnasium.”29 
The text was therefore clearly conceived as a handbook of Aristote-
lian-Thomistic metaphysics insofar as it described in its introductory 
section an uninterrupted relationship between Aristotle’s thinking, 
the doctrine of Aquinas, and the teaching of Gorkum and of his 
successors on the one hand, and of the learning of the “baccalaurii 
magistrandi” on the other.30 Although such “school-awareness” some-
entium solerter insertae, disputativo processui magistrorum praememorati Gymnasii omni-
quaque conformes, quibus baccalaurii magistrandi, a nonnullis metaphysici appellati, iamiam 
physicas supergredientes disciplinas, ea quae primae reservantur philosophiae, intelligent […], 
ed. H. QUENTELL, Köln 1502. From now on the title of the work will be abbreviated as 
Quaestiones compendiosae. On the role of book printing in the polemics between various 
schools in late medieval Cologne, see W. SCHMITZ, “Das Kölner Verlagswesen der Frühen 
Neuzeit als Mittler für die Bildung im Rheinland,” in: A. RUTZ (ed.), Das Rheinland als 
Schul- und Bildungslandschaft (1250-1750), Köln 2010, pp. 233-260, esp. 235-237. 
28. Cf. WEILER, Heinrich von Gorkum, p. 118. On Lambert de Monte see for exam-
ple: H.G. SENGER, “Was geht Lambert von Heerenberg die Seligkeit des Aristoteles an?,” 
in: A. ZIMMERMANN (ed.), Studien zur mittelalterlichen Geistesgeschichte und ihren Quellen, 
Berlin / New York 1982, pp. 293-311 and S. NEGRI, “La quaestio ‘De salvatione Aristo-
telis’ del Tomista Lamberto di Monte,” in: A. PALAZZO (ed.), L’antichità classica nel pen-
siero medievale, Porto 2011, pp. 413-440. On the origin and early development of Albert-
ism, see the studies of G. Meersseman, especially Geschichte des Albertismus: Heft I. Die 
Pariser Anfänge des Kölner Albertismus, Paris 1933. 
29. Cf. the heading of the Quaestiones compendiosae reported above, footnote 27. 
30. See Quaestiones compendiosae, f. 1ra: “Statui iccirco nobiliores flores metaphysicae 
circa aureum tractatum doctoris sancti De ente et essentia sese offerentes in unum colligere 
et eos post quaestiones motas instar syllogismorum summatim resolvere. Cuius resolu-
tionis fundamentum et anchora firmissima erit philosophorum princeps Arestoteles, 
eiusque gloriosissimus expositor sanctus Thomas et magister Henricus de Gorynchem, qui 
elegantiores sententias primae philosophiae artificiosissime comportavit et ad quasdam 
magistrales redegit positiones. Quarum plurimae cernuntur quaestionibus huius com-
pendij quam congruentissime insertae ad eruditionem baccalauriorum Bursae Montis in 
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times took the form of a harmonizing combination of different opin-
ions of the college’s masters (this is the case, for example, with the 
discussion concerning the real difference between being and essence),31 
in the questions devoted to the doctrine of universals there is not such 
an explicit mixture of opinions internal to the Thomistic school. 
Rather, the discussion is limited to the disagreements between differ-
ent schools of thought.
As for Gerard de Monte’s commentary on Thomas’s De quiddita-
tibus rerum (an alternative title for the De ente et essentia), written in 
the first half of the fifteenth century and repeatedly printed in 
Cologne from 1485 on, this was also intended as a scholarly tool for 
summarizing, in a canonical way, Thomas’s doctrine.32 As to its form, 
it provides a quite literal expositio textus of the De ente et essentia, and 
develops its themes in some further considerations and dubitationes. 
The text shows a substantial homogeneity with the Quaestiones, at 
least with reference to the core thesis on which I am focusing. There-
fore, I will take into account both texts together, trying to identify 
some recurring features in their strategy of argumentation.
An initially recognizable step in the Quaestiones compendiosae is an 
interpretation of the Thomist position of what we might call a ‘moder-
ate realism,’ differing from some form of radical realism on the one 
hand, and nominalism on the other. The first question about universals 
Colonia, qui physicam considerationem transcendentes negotiari merentur circa ea quae 
extra materiam inveniuntur.” 
31. The passage contains a very interesting example of the concordistic efforts of 
Thomas’s followers. The author of the Quaestiones discusses the relationship between 
being and essence, and juxtaposes two opposite corollaria, reporting respectively the opin-
ion of Henry of Gorkum and that of Gerard de Monte. The concordistic solution finally 
suggested rests upon the texts of Thomas; see Quaestiones compendiosae, f. 14rb-va. Cf. 
also WEILER, Heinrich von Gorkum, pp. 117-118. 
32. See GERARD DE MONTE, In Thomae Aquinatis tractatum De ente et essentia com-
mentum, ed. T. MOLNER or K. WELKER, Köln 1485/86 (in what follows I will abbreviate 
the title of the text as: In De ente et essentia commentum). This commentary was also 
printed in Cologne many times. In 1493 for example it was printed by Heinrich Quentell 
together with the Quaestiones super Parva naturalia Aristotelis of Johannes Versor and 
Thomas’s De ente et essentia (GW M50262). As a terminus ante quem for its composition 
we could assume 1426, if we trust the colophon of the text in the manuscript: Tübingen, 
Universitätsbibliothek, Mc 142, f. 62vb; cf. H. RÖCKELEIN, Die lateinischen Handschriften 
der Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen, Teil I, beschrieben von H. RÖCKELEIN unter 
Mitwirkung von G. BRINKHUS, H. WEIGEL und U. HASCHER-BURGER, Wiesbaden 1991, 
pp. 284-285. 
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discussed by Henry concerns the existence of universals in relation to 
singular beings.33 The syllogistic solution to the problem seems to tend 
towards a kind of realism.34 In one sense, a universale is a supreme cause 
which can produce many specifically different effects; such a universal 
cause is studied in metaphysics.35 Moreover, the universal can be con-
ceived as a “second intention” in a “material way,” that is as a nature 
— such as “man, animal, horse” — to which the intellect “sometimes 
attributes the intention of universality.” This universal is also said to 
have being in extra-mental things.36 Such a universal, “signified through 
concrete things,” is not really different from those singular beings to 
which it is referred; rather, it exists in those singulars.37 Finally, the 
universal is intended “as such,” i.e., as that nature — “man, animal, 
horse” — conceived with respect to universality. This is said to possess 
existence due to its “relation to the soul” (universale in praedicando).38 
33. Quaestiones compendiosae, f. 7va: “Quaeritur utrum ponenda sint universalia rebus 
sensibilibus contradistincta atque ab eis separata.”  
34. Henry constructs a quasi-syllogistic argument (Quaestiones compendiosae, f. 7va): 
“Maior: Asserit philosophorum recta doctrina, secundum duos primos modos universalia 
esse veraciter in rebus ad extra. Minor: Secundum tertiam universalis acceptionem docet 
universalia esse philosophorum schola per relationem ad actum animae. Conclusio: Secun-
dum singulas suas particulas negandus est titulus quaestionis, iuxta illum sensum qui 
asscribitur positioni Platonis.” 
35. Ibid.: “[…] nam universale uno modo capitur pro universali in causando, et dic-
itur illud quod eque primo potest esse causa plurium effectuum specie differentium. […] 
De talibus enim universalibus intelligi potest illud dictum quod metaphysica est de max-
ime universalibus, quia est de primis principiis et causis entium.” Cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaph., 
I, 2, 982a247-25.  
36. Ibid.: “Alio modo contingit loqui de universali prout est secundae intentionis. Et 
hoc diversimode, qui vel per universalia intelliguntur ipsae naturae materialiter, quibus 
intellectus quandoque attribuit intentionem universalitatis […] Similiter patet quia uni-
versalia secundo modo dicta habent esse in rebus ad extra. Quia hoc modo per universalia 
intelliguntur ipsae naturae, cuiusmodi sunt animal, equus, lapis etc., quae designantur per 
hunc nominativum pluralem ‘universalia’, eo quod intellectus circa eas adinvenit respec-
tum secundae intentionis, quando circa eas negotiatur intelligendo comparationem earum 
ad sua subiecta, de quibus enunciantur. Constat autem tales naturas habere esse in rebus 
ad extra.” 
37. Ibid.: “[…] naturae significatae per talia concreta, homo, equus, animal, sunt 
immixtae singularibus, et per eas singularia corruptibilia constituuntur in esse, nec possunt 
ab eis secundum esse separari. […] naturae quae significantur talibus concretis, homo, 
equus aut lapis, sunt singulares secundum esse quod habent in rebus ad extra, et eaedem 
naturae comparatae ad actum animae dicuntur universales.” 
38. Ibid.: “Vel alio modo per universalia intelliguntur universalia inquantum talia, id 
est prout ipsae naturae subsunt intentioni universalitatis. Et sic tunc vel loquimur de eis 
per respectum ad actum animae, et hoc modo dicuntur universalia in praedicando […].” 
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To this kind of nature “known by the intellect without any individuat-
ing condition” is attributed “the definition of the universal, i.e., being 
one in many things and of many things.”39 That is to say, as is under-
lined in a corollary, universality properly understood, to the extent that 
it possesses being, is in the soul.40 Apart from the emphatic denial of 
the separate existence of the universal in a Platonic sense, i.e., as an 
“ydea” or “exemplar form,” Henry does accord a mode of existence to 
the other types of universal, even if the existence of the universal as such 
is found only in the intellect, and the universal in re is solely under-
stood with reference to singular beings.
As mentioned, Henry’s first position seems thus to set the bound-
aries between extreme realism, non-Platonic realism and nominalism. 
The nominales are briefly mentioned as supporters of the thesis that 
universals “in praedicando” are “termini communes sive in mente sive 
in voce.”41 This position is, however, neither discussed nor refuted. 
It quite evidently did not constitute an urgent polemical point of 
reference.42 This is also true of Gerard’s commentary, where the nom-
inalist viewpoint is not even really challenged. Rather, his dismissal 
of nominalism remains implicit.43 This fact should not be too surpris-
ing. As has been noticed by other historians of the period, the nomi-
nalists at Cologne had already been reduced to a minority by 1425.44 
Their tradition of Buridanism, which was well established by the 
late-fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth century,45 was suc-
ceeded by the realism of those masters who taught Aristotle from the 
39. Ibid., f. 7vb: “[…] accipiuntur ab intellectu absque conditionibus individuantibus, 
et secundum tale esse competit eis definitio universalis, scilicet esse unum in multis et de 
multis.” For this definition, cf. Auctoritates Aristotelis, 36, 124, ed. J. HAMESSE, Louvain 
/ Paris 1974, p. 321, 76; THOMAS AQUINAS, Sentencia libri de anima, I, 1, ed. Leon. 45.1, 
Paris 1984, p. 7, 215-218. 
40. Ibid.: “Et hoc modo naturae humanae secundum esse quod habet in apprehen-
sione, qua apprehenditur praeter conditiones individuantes, potest attribui respectus 
speciei vel universalis, non autem secundum esse quod habet in re ad extra […].” 
41. Ibid., f. 7va. 
42. Tewes already pointed out – also drawing on Weiler’s thesis – Henry of Gorkum’s 
generally unconfrontational attitude towards the nominalists. See TEWES, Die Bursen der 
Kölner Artisten-Fakultät, pp. 354-355. 
43. By contrast, he is much more concerned with the doctrine “which is ascribed to 
Plato.” See GERARD DE MONTE, In De ente et essentia commentum, f. 15ra. 
44. Cf. for example EHRLE, Der Sentenzenkommentar, p. 281ff. and MEUTHEN, Kölner 
Universitätsgeschichte, p. 172ff. 
45. Cf. TEWES, Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät, p. 285ff. 
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perspective of Albert and Thomas.46 The latter were, if not the only, 
then surely the most powerful faction in that academic milieu during 
the entire century. The few vestiges of nominalist doctrine that 
remained, as we will see, were confined to the teaching of logic in 
specific school books. 
In fact, if we look at both Henry of Gorkum and Gerard de 
Monte’s texts, it becomes clear that it is the realist views of Albert the 
Great and his followers which are most directly at issue. Indeed, we 
see how in the dispute over universals Thomists were continually 
forced to contend with Albert’s own ideas, on the authoritative side, 
and with the Albertists themselves, who were their interlocutors, on 
the other. 
In the text by Henry of Gorkum, the opinion of the Albertists is 
discussed in the eleventh metaphysical position, which describes dis-
tinctive features of the realism of the via antiqua, especially by asking 
whether universals ante rem, in re and post rem are to be admitted.47 
Quite interestingly, Henry describes a core of thinking “communiter 
concessum.” For the Thomist, the common ground of the ancient 
way’s followers is constituted by the rejection of the Platonic univer-
sal — which occurs as a topos in all treatments of universals48 — and 
by the assumption that the universal, properly speaking, is obtained 
through intellectual abstraction.49 There is still a question, however, 
46. Cf. M.J.F.M. HOENEN, “Nominalism in Cologne: the student notebook of the 
Dominican Servatius Fanckel. With an edition of a Disputatio Vacantialis held on July 
14, 1480 ‘Utrum in Deo uno simplicissimo sit trium personarum realis distinctio’,” in: 
S.E. YOUNG (ed.), Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities, Leiden 2011, pp. 85-114, 
here pp. 92-93, with further references. 
47. Quaestiones compendiosae, f. 8ra: “Quaeritur utrum veram positionem cupientes 
defendere teneantur triplex universale, scilicet ante rem, in re et post rem.” 
48. The exposition and dismissal of the “Platonic position,” so far as it was known 
from Aristotle’s account of it, is a topos both in nominalist and in realist treatments on 
universals. Nominalist authors, in particular, did not miss the opportunity to hint at the 
heresy entailed in that extreme realism. Cf. for example JOHANNES PARREUDT, Textus 
veteris artis f. a IIIr. 
49. See Quaestiones compendiosae, f. 8rb: “Pro declaratione huius materiae est adver-
tendum quod quaestio […] intelligitur de universali secundum rationem universalis. Hoc 
autem modo aliqua sunt communiter concessa de universali, et aliquid est opinabile pro 
utraque parte. Exempli gratia, quod non sint [coni.: sunt ed.] ponenda universalia iuxta 
positionem quae Platoni imponitur, hoc ab omnibus conceditur. Quod etiam ponenda 
sint universalia facta per abstractionem intellectus, et prout aliquid in ordine ad actum 
rationis potest accipi ut unum in multis, communiter est concessum.” 
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about whether there is a sense, apart from those mentioned above, 
according to which a ‘nature’ can be called ‘universal.’50 
As for Gerard de Monte, he first explains, with reference to Thom-
as’s three meanings of the essence “in concreto accepta” that nature 
absolutely considered (“absolute considerata”), nature “as it is in this 
or in that” (“prout est in hoc vel in illo”) and nature “as it is in the 
soul” (“prout est in anima”) are predicable respectively through 
essential predicates (“praedicata essentialia”), real accidental predi-
cates (“praedicata accidentalia realia”) and intentional accidental 
predicates (“praedicata accidentalia intentionalia”).51 This taxonomy 
is not found in the text of Thomas, yet became a topos in the later 
Thomistic doctrine of universals.52 This move evidently implies a 
logical consideration of the “threefold natures” of the De ente et essen-
tia. Quite strikingly, however, Gerard further juxtaposes this explana-
tion of the “triformis acceptio naturae” with a “threefold considera-
tion of light.”53 After having characterized the distinction proposed 
in the De ente et essentia as a rational one, he uses the three categories 
ante rem, in re and post rem with reference to the functioning of the 
light in order to describe the three different modes of considering a 
nature.54 This is significant, for further on, Gerard discusses Albert’s 
50. Ibid.: “Utrum autem praeter praedictos modos possit natura humana dici univer-
salis, relinquitur sub dubio. Et sicut exempli gratia dicitur de natura humana, ita univer-
saliter intelligendum est de qualibet alia natura.” 
51. Ibid., f. 14va-b. 
52. For example, we find it expressed quite systematically in the later Commentary 
on the De ente et essentia of the Leipziger Thomist Johannes de Lindholz; see Quaestiones 
[de ente et essentia] cum textu beati Thomae Aquinatis in Liptzensi Gymnasio per magistrum 
Johannem Lintholtz de Monchebergk […] correctae, ed. W. MOLITORIS Leipzig 1505, f. B 
6r. Johannes combined Thomas’s three different considerations of one nature not only 
with the threefold mode of predication, but also with the threefold distinction of the 
universal ante rem, in re and post rem, emphasizing that there is only one nature which 
can be approached or expressed from different perspectives. In this sense, he departed 
significantly from Thomas’s own exposition. About Johannes de Lindholz and his works 
cf. M. HÖHLE, Universität und Reformation. Die Universität Frankfurt (Oder) von 1506 
bis 1550, Köln / Weimar / Wien 2002, pp. 77-82. 
53. See GERARD DE MONTE, In De ente et essentia commentum, f. 15rb.  
54. Ibid. The author arrives at the following scheme: the “natura secundum se et 
absoluta” corresponds to the “lumen […] in effluxu a corpore lucido ante incidentiam in 
nubem yrialem,” and is also called “formal ypostasis” of the individuals (“natura ante 
rem”), as light is “quodammodo formalis hypostasis colorum.” The “natura considerata 
ut est recepta in suis singularibus” corresponds to the “lumen secundum quod est diffu-
sum in dyaphonum densum” (“natura in re”); finally, nature considered “prout est a 
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and the Albertists’ doctrine of universals, taking into account their 
own light metaphor, according to which the first cause is the first 
light radiating forms. In this discussion, Gerard rejects the Albertist 
position.55 As in the Quaestiones compendiosae, the breaking point 
with the Albertists is represented by a different understanding of the 
universale ante rem and in re,56 whereas the assertion of the universal 
as post rem is somehow taken for granted.
Now, one should notice that the discussion of Albert and the 
Albertists’ opinion occupies considerable space in both commentaries. 
This fact could be construed as a mere consequence of institutional 
rivalry. As we will see, however, there were also deeper doctrinal rea-
sons behind this polemic between two parties belonging to the same 
via, namely that of moderate realism. 
3. The Albertist Side
Considerations of space prevent any detailed discussion of the his-
torical facts which pertain to the arrival and establishment in Cologne 
of powerful followers of the via antiqua. We have known for some 
time, from the extant documents, about the patterns which brought 
Parisian Albertists and Thomists to Cologne.57 It has also already 
been pointed out how Henry of Gorkum, the monarcha thomistarum, 
invited Heymericus de Campo, pupil of the Parisian Albertist 
Johannes de Nova Domo, from Diest to Cologne — thus opening 
singularibus abstracta et ab intellectu communiter apprehensa” corresponds to the “lumen 
secundum quod a corpore denso illuminato resilit spiritualiter multiplicando suos radios 
visibiles ad potentiam visivam” (“natura post rem”). 
55. Ibid., f. 16rb ff. The vocabulary of the light as hypostasis colorum, derived from 
Aristotle (cf. De anima, II, 7, 418b 9-10) and often used by Albert the Great as a term 
of similitude (as noticed by A. DE LIBERA, La mystique rhénane d’Albert le Grand à Maître 
Eckhart, Paris 1994, p. 161, n. 107), was for example present in Johannes de Nova 
Domo’s Treatise on Universals, where it functioned as a term of comparison for the light 
of the form-giving principle, i.e., the causa prima or the intelligence. Cf. G. MEERSSEMAN, 
“Eine Schrift des Kölner Universitätsprofessors Heymericus de Campo oder des Pariser 
Prof. Johannes de Nova Domo?,” in: Jahrbuch des kölnischen Geschichtsvereins 18 (1936), 
pp. 144-168, here p. 153: “Sicut enim lumen est hypostasis colorum, sic lumen intelli-
gentiae est radix formae, in eo quod est communicabilis.” 
56. After having described the subdivision of a nature ante rem, in re and post rem, 
Gerard notices (ibid., f. 16ra): “Et ob id nonnulli distinguunt triplex universale, scilicet 
ante rem, in re et post rem, accipientes universale extenso modo.” 
57. Cf. TEWES, Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät, pp. 332 ff. 
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the way for the inauguration of an institutionalized Albertist school 
in the German region.58 
Now, the first work of Heymericus in Cologne, written about 
1423, became a sort of manifesto for the Albertist school, which 
gained its own bursa around that time. In his Tractatus problematicus, 
or Problemata inter Albertum Magnum et sanctum Thomam, Heymer-
icus took on the task of tracing the boundaries of his own doctrinal 
line by first strongly criticizing the doctrine of universals held by 
Platonists and nominalists, and then discussing eighteen problems on 
philosophical subjects. His goal was to show that Albert’s interpreta-
tions of Aristotle in many cases not only differed from, but were also 
superior to Aquinas’s.59 Heymericus’s declared intention was in fact 
to reaffirm the true Aristotelian doctrine on universals, from which 
the moderni had deviated, and to solve some doctrinal disagreements 
among the antiqui.60 But in the background Heymericus aspired to 
grant the Albertist way the label of authentic heir to the Aristotelian 
tradition.61 In doing so, he first investigated the nature of universals, 
which he defined as “cardines et principia cuiuslibet artis et 
scientiae.”62 Among other things, he demonstrated that universals 
possess a reality not as “separated from singular beings, as the Plato-
nici maintain,” nor as merely post rem, that is, as mere abstractions or 
“common concepts,” as the moderni held.63 Then, and most impor-
58. See the information provided in the Invectiva of Heymericus de Campo: MEERSSE-
MAN, Geschichte des Albertismus II, p. 6* (114). For the biography of Heymericus, see 
F. HAMANN, Das Siegel der Ewigkeit. Universalwissenschaft und Konziliarismus bei 
Heymericus de Campo, Münster 2006, pp. 17-63. 
59. See HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Problemata inter Albertum Magnum et sanctum 
Thomam ad utriusque opinionis intelligentiam multum conferentia, ed. J. LANDEN, Köln 
1496 (GW 12405) [hereafter abbreviated as: Problemata]. The list of the extant manu-
scripts of the Tractatus problematicus is provided in P. RUTTEN, “Contra occanicam disco-
liam modernorum: The So-Called De universali reali and the Dissemination of Albertist 
Polemics against the via moderna,” in: Bulletin de Philosophie médiévale 45 (2003), pp. 
131-165, esp. 162-163.  
60. See HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Problemata, f. a IIr. 
61. Cf. for example HOENEN, “Comment lire,” p. 112. 
62. See HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Problemata, f. a IIr. 
63. Ibid., f. a IIIr-v. On Heymericus’s doctrine of universals see G. MEERSSEMAN, 
Geschichte des Albertismus II, pp. 28-33; RUTTEN, “Contra occanicam discoliam moderno-
rum” and Mario Meliadò’s contribution in this issue, “Scientia peripateticorum. Heymeri-
cus de Campo, the Book of Causes, and the Debate over Universals in the Fifteenth 
Century.” On the Albertists’ view of the problem, see also S. WLODEK, “Albert le Grand 
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tantly, Heymericus devoted himself to the long and accurate treat-
ment of the problemata between “Albertists and Thomists.”64 That is, 
after having decidedly dismissed the position of the radical realists 
and of the nominalists, Heymericus still felt forced to question the 
opinion of Thomas and his followers about “whether the universal 
ante rem, in re and post rem are the same thing.”65 This fact is very 
significant. As has been shown, Heymericus’s main objection against 
the nominalists — i.e., that they destroy the possibility of a real sci-
ence by reducing the universal to a “tenuis similitudo singularium”66 
— was also directed against the Thomist conception.67 Heymericus 
maintained, following his master Johannes de Nova Domo, the essen-
tial unity and existential diversity of the threefold universal ante rem, 
in re and post rem, employing Albert’s idea of fluxus in order to 
ground this hierarchy of universal beings. This theory, so Heymericus 
thought, was able to ground knowledge, insofar as it assumed that the 
object known through the universal species is essentially the real 
object itself, the universal essence instantiated in the individual 
thing.68 Notoriously, this picture was not to be found in Thomas. 
Moreover, Thomists, as we have briefly seen, traditionally tended to 
attribute complete universality only to the univeral concept known 
by the mind. In this sense, Heymericus’s account of universals ques-
tioned the theoretical foundation of the Thomists, charging them 
with an inability to found a real science.69
Taking into account this evidence, it is not difficult to understand 
why Thomists engaged themselves in quite detailed analyses of the 
arguments of the Albertists. For example, Gerard de Monte almost 
et les albertistes du XVe siècle. Le problème des universaux,” in: A. ZIMMERMANN (ed.), 
Albert der Große. Seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung, Berlin / New York 1981, pp. 193-
207; DE LIBERA, La querelle des universaux, pp. 434-440; H. WELS, “Einige Spezifika des 
Albertistischen Universalienrealismus bei Johannes de Nova Domo und in einem anony-
men Tractatus de universalis natura,” in: CESALLI – GERMANN – HOENEN (eds.), Univer-
sity, Council, City, pp. 97-111. 
64. See HEYMERICUS DE CAMPO, Problemata, f. a VIr: “Restat nunc […] dissolvere 
problemata inter Albertistas et Thomistas […].” 
65. Ibid., f. b Iv: “Problema secundum erat an idem esset universale ante rem, in re 
et post rem.” 
66. Ibid., f. b IIr and also f. a IIIv. 
67. Cf. MELIADÒ, “Scientia peripateticorum,” p. 209. 
68. Ibid., f. b IIr. 
69. Cf. MELIADÒ, “Scientia peripateticorum,” pp. 206-210. 
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certainly had Heymericus’s work in mind, as testified by his later 
direct reply to Heymericus, which I will discuss below. And even 
though we are not sure about the dating of the Quaestiones of Henry 
of Gorkum, we can justifiably assume that the master operated in a 
context in which the sort of critique formulated by Hemyericus was 
common. Indeed, Heymericus’s instructor, Johannes de Nova Domo, 
who taught in the same Parisian milieu as the monarcha thomistarum, 
had already traced in his De esse et essentia, as well as in his Treatise 
on Universals, the doctrinal line later followed in Cologne. 
4. The Thomistic Strategy: Canonization and Inclusion
Since they approached the question on universals within the frame-
work of the De ente et essentia, Thomists felt more or less obliged to 
defend Aquinas’s position. At the same time, however, they had to 
pay close attention to the other realist position, i.e., the Albertist one, 
which depended on a metaphysical system quite different from that 
of Thomas and which claimed to be the truer heir to the Aristotelian 
tradition. Faced with this double need, the Thomists chose a strategy 
of both differentiating their own position from that of their rivals, 
while also including aspects of it. 
The general formulation of the problem by Henry of Gorkum in 
the Quaestiones compendiosae is quite revealing. It concerns the true 
doctrine of the “philosophers.” Henry sets in opposition to one 
another the opinion of the ancients, who maintained that the only 
real universals are those post rem,70 and the opinion of Albert the 
Great, who “stated that according to the philosophers there must be 
three universals, i.e., ante rem, in re and post rem.”71 Albert’s doctrine 
is described through the notion of “communicability and participabil-
ity” of each form and by explicitly recalling some passages of the 
master’s Commentary on Book V of the Metaphysics.72 Predictably, 
70. See Quaestiones compendiosae, f. 8ra: “Et videtur primo auctoritatibus quod solum 
sint ponenda universalia post rem, cum universale sit per abstractionem intellectus.” 
71. Ibid.: “In oppositum est auctoritas venerabilis domini Alberti, asserentis etiam 
hanc esse mentem philosophorum, quod triplex sit ponendum universale, scilicet ante 
rem, in re et post rem.”  
72. Ibid., ff. 8rb-9va. The author first maintains that “[…] venerabilis dominus Alber-
tus in diversis locis suae doctrinae distinguit universale in universale ante rem, in re et 
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given his Thomistic leaning, Henry’s own conclusion rests on that 
first position of the “ancients”: “Loquendo igitur proprie, nullum est 
universale ante rem vel in re, sed post rem praecise.”73 Nevertheless, 
Henry also suggests a compromise solution in order to incorporate 
the opinion of Albert, albeit one that Albert himself might not have 
accepted. This compromise is effected through the distinction 
between proprie loquendo and communiter loquendo. In a proper sense, 
and also speaking “according to the perfect and complete concept 
of universality,”74 universals are only intellectual entities, as the 
Thomists generally held. In a broader sense (loquendo communiter), 
however — which is to say, taking the universal as something com-
municable or as something indifferently related to many things — 
then “we can also concede the universale ante rem.”75 And it is in this 
last sense, we read, that Albert the Great understood the nature of 
universals.76 The compromise is achieved, then, through a neutraliza-
tion of Albert’s proper metaphysical assumptions and from an attri-
bution to his doctrine of a weaker comprehension of the term “uni-
versal” itself.77 The last word on the question is, however, Thomas’s. 
The sententia sancti Doctoris is presented as a general exegetical model; 
it is literally “canonized.” It reads as follows: “[…] ratio universalis 
solum potest attribui naturae humanae prout significatur ut forma 
post rem.” Then, with reference to the twofold modes of consideration of a universale ante 
rem, he specifies: “Hos igitur duos modos universalis ante rem enumerat super V Meta-
physicae.” Further on (f. 9vb), the same work is recalled with respect to Albert’s distinction 
of a universal actu, potentia, natura and opinione. For the corresponding 
passages in Albert the Great’s work see ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Metaphysica. Libri quinque 
priores, V, 6, 5, ed. B. GEYER (Opera Omnia, 16.1), Münster 1960, p. 285, 8 ff. 
73. See Quaestiones compendiosae, f. 8va. Furthermore, cf. f. 9ra: “Relinquitur ergo 
quod solum sit universale post rem, non solum propter abstractionem, sed inquantum 
quilibet intellectus potest quamlibet formam comparare ad multa de quibus enunciatur, 
ut una in apprehensione, et secundum hoc adinvenire [coni.: advenire ed.] respectum 
speciei vel generis vel universalis.” 
74. The Latin text reads here: “secundum perfectam et completam universalis 
rationem.” 
75. Ibid.: “[…] loquendo communiter prout idem reputantur esse multis communi-
cabile seu indifferenter se habere ad multa et esse universale, tunc non est difficile con-
cedere universalia ante rem.” On the notion of communicability with respect to universals, 
see further footnote 82.  
76. Ibid.: “Unde Albertus, si bene inspiciatur, videtur secundum talem acceptionem 
procedere.” 
77. Ibid.: “Sed hoc est loqui de universali secundum quandam inchoationem suae 
rationis […].” 
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totius et secundum esse quod habet in apprehensione rationis.”78 
Notably, the opinion is not a verbatim citation from Thomas, but 
rather a sort of brief comment on chapter 3 of the De ente et essentia. 
This sort of summary demonstrates the most recognizable kernel of 
the Thomistic doctrine of universals. Quite interestingly, Thomas is 
explicitly cited only at the end of the argumentation. If we look care-
fully, his opinion sounds like a legitimation of the common ground 
admitted by the realists and, moreover, as a loyal reworking of the 
opinion of the ancients. In addition, Albert’s position is in a sense 
enclosed in this hermeneutical development. Correspondingly, the 
doctrine of the De ente et essentia, which remains the framework of 
the exposition, is expanded through foreign categories in order to 
encompass the rival position. 
If we turn now to Gerard’s commentary, we find that the argu-
ments employed there to engage the followers of Albert are very 
similar to those in Henry’s handbook. Gerard maintains the existence 
of the solely universal post rem, as far as the proper universal is con-
cerned.79 He thus rejects the radical presupposition of the Albertists, 
namely, the idea that every form as such, insofar as it is communica-
ble and participable — throughout its fluxus — is a universal: ante 
rem as it is in the light of the first cause, in re as it is instantiated in 
individuals, and post rem as it is abstracted by the intellect.80 As was 
the case with Henry, Gerard refuses to completely dismiss the posi-
tion of his Albertist rivals; quite the contrary. That is, he also admits 
a threefold characterization of the universal, to the extent that it is 
more widely, and not properly, intended as “communicable,” or as 
“that nature which can fall under the intention of universality.” In 
78. Ibid. The sentence is introduced as follows: “Et per consequens canonisatur sen-
tentia sancti doctoris.” 
79. As in the Quaestiones compendiosae, this thesis is immediately referred by Gerard 
to the authority of the “philosophers,” that is, Aristotle, Boethius, Avicenna and Averroes. 
Cf. GERARD DE MONTE, In De ente et essentia commentum, f. 16ra. 
80. The principle on which “many [philosophers]” base their assertions is, according 
to Gerard’s own words, that: “[…] quaelibet forma secundum quod huiusmodi est com-
municabilis et participabilis pluribus, et per consequens quaelibet forma, quantum est de 
se, est universalis” (ibid., f. 16ra-b). Gerard’s description of the theory of the Albertists 
and then of Albert is also to be found at f. 16 ra-b. Henrik Wels has maintained that 
Gerard’s account of Albert’s doctrine of universals is strictly dependent on some passages 
of the Tractatus universalium composed by Johannes de Nova Domo; see WELS, “Einige 
Spezifika,” pp. 103-106.  
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this sense the threefold universal falls within a nature considered as 
ante rem, that is, as absolute, in re, that is, in individuals, and post 
rem, that is, in the intellect, according to the above-mentioned phys-
ical light-metaphor.81 Since this threefold mode of considering a 
nature is just what Thomas put in chapter 3 of the De ente et essentia, 
while recalling the famous Avicennian doctrine, it is clear how Albert’s 
and the Albertists’ threefold distinction is finally, though implicitly, 
traced back to Aquinas. Through the identification of the universal 
— comprehended in its general, if incomplete sense — with the 
nature considered and predicated as universal, and through a vague 
employment of the idea of communicabilitas,82 Gerard opened the 
way for a position that pretended to incorporate his rivals’ doctrine 
81. See GERARD DE MONTE, In De ente et essentia commentum, f. 16va: “[…] si uni-
versale accipiatur prout idem est quod communicabile vel pro ipsa natura quae potest 
subici intentioni universalitatis, tunc est admittenda distinctio universalis, qua universale 
dividitur in universale ante rem natura tantum, et in universale in re, et in universale post 
rem. Et haec distinctio correspondet triplici acceptioni naturae in littera superius recita-
tae.” 
82. The idea of the communicabilitas proper to the universal was at the center of 
Albert’s and the Albertists’ account on the topic. For example, Johannes de Nova Domo’s 
Treatise on universals opened with a quaestio which read: “Quaeritur utrum universale, 
quod est forma, communicabilitatem propriam habeat ex hoc quod est universale in re, 
vel ex hoc quod est universale ante rem.” See MEERSSEMAN, “Eine Schrift,” p. 152. 
Heymericus de Campo, in one passage of his Tractatus problematicus (f. b IIIr-v), made 
clear that the communicability of a form derived “secundum quod naturaliter praevenit 
proportionem ipsius cum materia, quomodo dicitur forma tantum et radius luminis intel-
ligentiae suae primae causae, quae secundum auctorem De causis […] nominatur a 
philosophis nomine sui primi causati‚ intelligentia.” Thomist masters, as we have seen, 
were very aware of the centrality of this notion in their rivals’ position. They had also to 
admit it in a certain way in order to preserve the Aristotelian definition of a universal as 
something which is “aptum natum esse unum in multis et de multis.” In this sense, then, 
they attributed a very general sense to the word communicabilitas, as is shown in this pas-
sage from the Quaestiones compendiosae (f. 8va): “[…] notandum est circa expositionem 
quorundam nominum, quibus utimur circa praesentem materiam, videlicet ‘communica-
bile’, ‘participabile’ et ‘universale.’ Nam aliquid dicitur ‘communicabile’ quia potest 
pluribus convenire. ‘Participabile’ vero dicitur quia alicui convenit per plenitudinem et 
aliis derivatur secundum partes […]. Et ideo ubicumque est participatio, ibi est commu-
nicatio, sed non econtra, sicut in divinis ipsa essentia communicatur, sed non participatur. 
Universale vero superaddit praedictis unitatem: haec enim duo, scilicet unitas et pluralitas, 
clauduntur in ratione universalis. Nam universale dicitur quod est vel aptum natum est 
esse unum in multis et de multis.” By distinguishing between the participatio and the 
communicatio, the author perhaps had in mind a revealing passage from Albert’s Metaphys-
ics; cf. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Metaphysica, V, 6, 6, p. 286, 26-46.  
254 S. NEGRI
— neutralizing, once again, the proper sense of the Albertists’ doc-
trine of the fluxus of the universal essence.83 
A clearer picture is now beginning to emerge. In the two commen-
taries originating from the Montane College, chapter 3 of the De ente 
et essentia is canonized, as it were, as a “treatise on universals” in 
virtue of an established set of positions directly coming from the text. 
However, in comparing the traditional categories concerning the 
problem of the threefold existence of universals with the doctrines of 
their rivals, the followers of Thomas imposed on his text a variety of 
notions external to it. So, on the one hand, the universal in a strict 
sense is located exclusively in the intellect in order to avoid the met-
aphysical consequences of the Albertist doctrine of universals. At the 
same time, a certain ‘communicative’ reality, i.e., communicability, 
of the nature to which the universal refers seems to be stated in order 
to demarcate the realistic terrain. 
This reformulation, however, was not free of ambiguities. The first 
move implies the introduction of a double distinction in the concept 
of “universal,” i.e., universal in a proper sense, and universal in a 
broader sense. The second move requires the confrontation, albeit in 
83. Interestingly enough, the famous Erfurter nominalist master Bartholomeus 
Arnoldi de Usingen, discussing the problem of universals in one Exercitium collected in 
Erfurt some decades later, gave the following explanation concerning the doctrine of the 
Thomistae (see BARTHOLOMEUS ARNOLDI DE USINGEN, Exercitium veteris artis in Studio 
Erffordiensi collectum, ed. J. KNAPPUS, Erfurt 1514, f. C IIIv): “Et huiusmodi universale 
dicitur universale post rem, quia fit per abstractionem a singularibus, quae est post singu-
laria […]. Sed quod beatus Thomas in Scripto circa Secundum Sententiarum dicit naturam 
in particularibus esse universale in re, et abstractam a singularibus esse universale post rem, 
et universales formas rerum in mentibus angelorum esse universalia ante rem, intelligitur 
de universali communiter accepto, pro quocumque communicabili. Sed latior explanatio 
horum videatur apud Thomistas.” (Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, Super Sent., II, 3, 3, 2, ad 1, 
ed. P. MANDONNET, p. 117.) The nominalist therefore, reporting the opinion of his rivals, 
seems to confirm Gerard de Monte’s own move. Bartholomeus indeed informs us that 
when Thomas spoke of a threefold universal – in a passage that had to puzzle the Thom-
ists themselves, as we have noticed – he referred to it as universal “in a common sense,” 
as “communicable” in a general way. But that is just the way Gerard explains the possible 
admission of the Albertists’ threefold universal! On the Erfurter nominalist Bartholomeus 
von Usingen, see KLEINEIDAM, Universitas Studii Erffordensis, pp. 143 ff., 300-303; 
URBAN, “Die ‘via moderna’”; S. LALLA, Secundum viam modernam. Ontologischer Nomi-
nalismus bei Bartholomäus Arnoldi von Usingen, Würzburg 2003, esp. pp. 274-285; 
P. KÄRKKÄINEN, “Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen,” in: H. LAGERLUND (ed.), Encyclo-
pedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500, Dordrecht 2011, 
pp. 144-145. 
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a negative way, of Thomas’s nature “absolutely considered” as well as 
his nature considered “in re” with two types of universals. Neither 
move was present in the De ente et essentia. And in the two commen-
taries there seems to be no other direct mention of any of Thomas’s 
other texts.
5. Concordism in the Tractatus ostendens
All things considered, in both of the Cologne Thomist commentaries 
on the De ente et essentia, the desire to find a common ground with 
the Albertists, in spite of their differences, seems to exceed the desire 
for an accurate exegesis of Thomas’s works. Moreover, the Thomist 
strategy in dealing with the Albertists’ provocations rests on the neu-
tralization of their rivals’ doctrine by embracing it — albeit in a 
diminished and distorted form. 
This tendency found an ideological and crystallized expression in 
Gerard de Monte’s Tractatus ostendens concordiam sancti Thomae et 
venerabilis Alberti, written in 1456 in Cologne as a polemical — if 
not prompt — answer to Heymericus de Campo’s Tractatus problem-
aticus from 1423; Gerard’s work was later printed five times.84 
Gerard’s treatise had the declared aim of correcting Heymericus’s 
reading of Thomas Aquinas and of Thomas’s teacher Albert the 
Great, in order to make evident the substantial harmonization of their 
opinions.85 As stated by the author himself, the work was intended 
to show the unity of the positions of the two thinkers — who, after 
all, belonged to the same religious order and were both devoted to 
the same truth. Secondly, Gerard expressly aimed to avoid the errone-
ous interpretation of Thomas’s words that had been conveyed by the 
84. Gerard’s work, which has been transmitted, as far as I know, in seven manuscripts 
all originating from Central Europe, was printed in Cologne in 1485/86, ca. 1489, 1493, 
1497 and ca. 1503. I am currently preparing a critical edition of the text in the framework 
of the ANR-DFG Project “Thomismus und Antithomismus im Mittelalter”; for this 
paper, I will use the incunable of 1497, which also contains Gerard’s Apologia, i.e., his 
response to Heymericus’s own reaction (Invectiva) to the Tractatus ostendens. Moreover, 
this edition includes, among other texts, Aquinas’s De ente et essentia and Gerard’s own 
commentary on it. As to the Tractatus ostendens, see GERARD DE MONTE, Tractatus […] 
ad favorabilem dirigens concordiam quaedam problemata inter sanctum Thomam et venera-
bilem Albertum Magnum […], ed. H. QUENTELL, Köln 1497. 
85. Cf. HOENEN, “Comment lire.” 
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Tractatus problematicus.86 Finally, the work was intended to function 
as an interpretative key to Albert’s philosophical production, contrast-
ing with that of Heymericus. The question of the definition of true 
Aristotelianism and a ‘theologizing’ conception of philosophy perme-
ate the treatise as well. Gerard examined all the questions set down 
by Heymericus, adding three more seeming “contrarietates.”
In his reply to the second problem posed many years before by the 
Albertist, Gerard seemed to take seriously Heymericus’s criticism that 
the Thomists’ theory of universals was unable to ground a real sci-
ence.87 Once again, however, Gerard revises the Albertist contention 
to suit his own purposes. In accordance with his more general strat-
egy, Gerard professes to show that Albert and Thomas defended the 
same doctrine. The Thomist bases his solution on the discussion of 
the nature of the universal post rem in Thomas’s account, trying to 
show how it is, in a sense, the concrete thing in the world. At the 
same time, he suggests that, on the one hand, Albert had not main-
tained a strong identity between the three universals; and that, on the 
other hand, Thomas did state a certain identity among them.88 
Gerard achieves this ‘common ground’ of ‘relative identity’ by com-
bining passages from Thomas’s œuvre with a few connecting com-
ments. He first explains that Thomas defined the universal post rem, 
i.e., “what is predicable of many individuals,” as the “primary objec-
tive goal of the intellection,” or intentio intellecta, and not as the 
“intelligible species habitually informing the intellect.”89 He then 
86. Cf. GERARD DE MONTE, Apologetica sive responsiva […] ad quandam Invectivam a 
nonnullo recenti et opulento philosopho […], ed. H. QUENTELL, Köln 1497, f. g IVra: 
“[Tractatus problematicus] ponit enim sancti Thomae et venerabilis Alberti sententias et 
rationes contrarias esse, et nihilominus determinat veritatem continere illam sententiam 
quam dicit esse venerabilis domini Alberti. Ex quibus constat sequi falsam esse sententiam 
contrariam, quam assignat sancto Thomae.” 
87. Gerard’s reply to Heymericus’s secundum problema is to be found in his Tractatus 
ostendens, f. 28ra-va. 
88. On Gerard’s discussion see also MEERSSEMAN, Geschichte des Albertismus II, 
pp. 72-73. 
89. See GERARD DE MONTE, Tractatus ostendens, f. 38rb: “Non enim sanctus Thomas 
sentit quod species intelligibilis habitualiter informans intellectum ad intelligendum sit 
universale post rem et praedicabile de individuis, sed quod universale post rem sit termi-
nus obiectalis primarius ipsius intellectionis, cui termino convenit magis identificari cum 
re ad extra, quam ipsi habituali speciei intelligibili.” 
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builds on his constellation of citations,90 where the notion of simili-
tudo acts as an interpretative key.91 According to those passages from 
Thomas’s on which he relied, the principle and tool of intellection 
(i.e., the intelligible species), the universal concept or intention, and 
the known object, comprise a unity in their similitude. In this por-
trayal of Thomas’s doctrine, the master conveyed the idea that the 
content of knowledge is, in a certain sense, the thing in the extra-
mental world, that is, the nature (such as humanity) comprehended 
without individuating conditions. Moreover, he achieved his aim of 
harmonization. However, it is remarkable that he did not directly 
touch the core of Heymericus’s doctrine, i.e., the assertion of the 
essential unity of the universal ante rem, in re and post rem. Nor did 
he discuss the most original notions that could be found in Albert’s 
works.92 
By translating Heymericus’s critique from an ontological to a 
gnoseological level, Gerard made clear what he regarded as the proper 
terrain of the Thomistic doctrine on the topic. But at the same time, 
he avoided confronting the substantial difference between Albert’s 
and Thomas’s accounts of universals. This feature matches the strat-
egy pursued by Gerard in his solution to other controversies. For 
reasons that I cannot go into here, the concordance of Albert’s and 
Thomas’s positions was for Gerard an important goal to be pursued 
without sacrificing accuracy of exegesis. That is, in contrast with 
Heymericus’s more ‘eclectic’ exegeses of Albert and Thomas, grounded 
90. Gerard quotes in a quite literal way Thomas’s De ente et essentia, his Expositio libri 
Peryermenias, the Summa theologiae, the Summa contra gentiles, his Quodlibet V and the 
pseudepigraphic Tractatus de verbo. Cf. ibid., f. 38rb-va. 
91. In the long passage from the Summa contra gentiles, quoted by Gerard (Tractatus 
ostendens, f. 38va), Thomas maintained that both the intelligible species and the goal of 
the intellectual operation, or intentio intellectiva, are “similitudes of the intellected thing:” 
the first acts as principle and instrument of the intellection, and gives form to the intellect, 
whereas the second is formed by the intellect according to similitude. Therefore, as the 
intellect becomes similar to the external thing, and produces an intention similar to that 
thing, one can conclude that “the intellect, by forming such an intention, knows that 
thing.” Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa contra gentiles, cum Commentariis Francisci de Syl-
vestris Ferrariensis, I, 53, ed. Leon. 13, Roma 1918, pp. 150-151. 
92. It is noteworthy that the only quotations from Albert the Great given by Gerard 
in this context are taken from the De homine, and not from those later works where the 
master elaborated a more robust and characteristic theory on the nature of universals. On 
Albert’s doctrine of universals see DE LIBERA, La querelle des universaux, pp. 245-262.  
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in a selective use of their texts, Gerard adopts a literal approach to 
their texts. Having confused the real opinions of the masters with the 
successive interpretations of their heirs and followers was in fact for 
the Thomist the very root of his rival’s error.93
6. Other Accounts on Universals
If we look at the treatment of the question of universals in other later 
texts either written by Lambertus de Monte, the leader of the Bursa 
Montana from 1480 until his death in 1499, or prepared under his 
direction, we find a different approach, i.e., one that does not dem-
onstrate a desire to harmonize Albert and Thomas. In his commen-
tary on Aristotle’s De anima, for example, Lambert devoted consider-
able space to the problem of universals, answering traditional 
questions on the subject.94 Quite strikingly, however, Thomas’s text 
is never explicitly cited; nevertheless, his doctrine seems to have been 
internalized. The threefold division of nature originating from the De 
ente et essentia is combined with the notions of the universal ante rem, 
in re and post rem, and with the attribution of essential, real acciden-
tal and rational accidental predicates,95 but not discussed in relation 
to other positions. The universal in the intellect is labelled as “uni-
versale perfectum,”96 or as universal “according to the perfect concept 
of universality,”97 and is said to be in a “fundamental” way in external 
things.98 
93. See GERARD DE MONTE, Apologetica sive responsiva…ad quandam Invectivam a 
nonnullo recenti et opulento philosopho […], ed. H. QUENTELL, Köln 1497, f. g IIrb. 
94. See LAMBERT DE MONTE, Copulata in libros De anima Arestotelis, ed. H. QUENTELL, 
Köln 1487 ca. (GW M16768) [hereafter abbreviated as Copulata in De anima], 
f. b Ira ff. We are concerned here with the prologue of the commentary, where Lambert 
begins to address questions about the “unity of the definition of the soul,” and then goes 
on to discuss universals. 
95. Cf. LAMBERT DE MONTE, Copulata in De anima, f. b IIrb-b IIvb.  
96. Ibid., f. b IIra. 
97. Ibid., f. b IIvb: “Dicendum quod universale accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo 
secundum perfectam rationem universalitatis, et sic semper universale post rem est poste-
rius suis singularibus […] Alio modo accipitur universale secundum quod est ante rem 
vel in re, et sic est prius singularibus […].” 
98. Ibid., f. b IIra: “[…] universale perfectum, quod est universale post rem, est in 
rebus fundamentaliter […].” 
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A similar approach can be found in some Thomist logical Copu-
lata, which were expounded “secundum doctrinam Thomae Aquina-
tis.” Here, while introducing the second Treatise of Peter of Spain’ s 
Summulae, Lambert — or some of the masters at the Bursa, since the 
text is a product of the collective work of the College — made a 
distinction between the universal as a first and as a second intention.99 
Now, as a second intention, the universal is described as a relatio 
rationis, and therefore confined to a solely intellectual existence. But 
with regard to the universal as a prima intentio or a natura universalis, 
the author differentiates (1) an incomplete or potential universal, 
which is the essence or nature within individual beings, and (2) a 
complete or actualized universal. The latter he characterizes as “that 
nature deprived of its singularity” by the intellect. The former is “in 
potentia remota” with respect to its possibility of being predicated of 
many things, whereas the latter is “in potentia propinqua” to being 
predicated.100 In fact, the “predicability” of the universal is the proper 
subject of the text, in accordance with the Porphyrian tradition. 
In this sense, the triple distinction of the universale ante rem, in 
re and post rem, together with the threefold consideration of the nat-
ura communis, is integrated into a ‘predicational’ discussion of the 
99. Cf. Copulata commentaria textui omnium Tractatuum Petri Hyspani, etiam Parvo-
rum Logicalium et trium Modernorum […] secundum irrefragabilem et fundatissimam doc-
trinam divi Thomae Aquinatis Peripateticorum interpretis veracissimi, ac iuxta frequens 
exercitium magistrorum Coloniensis Gymnasii in Bursa Montis regentium […], ed. H. QUEN-
TELL, Köln 1496 (GW M32350) [hereafter abbreviated as: Copulata omnium Tractatuum 
Petri Hyspani], f. K IIIv: “Quaeritur utrum universale sit aliquid reale extra intellectum, 
vel sit solum in intellectu. Dicendum quod universale capitur dupliciter, uno modo pro 
secunda intentione, ut est quaedam relatio rationis in praedicabili ad intellectum et ad 
illud de quo est praedicabile. Et hoc universale solum est in intellectu […]. Alio modo 
capitur universale pro prima intentione, scilicet pro natura universali. Et sic accipitur 
dupliciter. Nam aliquid est universale in potentia et aliquid in actu. Universale in poten-
tia est ipsa quidditas, vel natura, quae est in re singulari, cui non repugnat esse in alio 
singulari quantum est de se, licet sibi repugnet in quantum facta est propria. Et ista natura 
sic accepta est in potentia remota ut praedicetur de pluribus: et vocatur alio nomine 
universale incompletum […]. Et sic universale est aliquid in re ad extra. Sed universale in 
actu est ipsa natura denudata a singularitate et a conditionibus materialitatis ipsorum 
singularium. Et est in potentia propinqua ut praedicetur de pluribus, ut vocatur universale 
completum, quia sibi conveniunt ea quae rationem perfecti universalis complent, sicut 
sunt unitas, quam habet ut est obiective apud intellectum, et pluralitas, inquantum 
plurificabilis est in diversis.” 
100. Cf. above, quotation in footnote 99. 
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universale.101 This distinction is definitively limited to the rational 
level, and is further employed in grounding the rational difference 
between the sciences of metaphysics, physics and logic.102 There is no 
discussion concerning the existence of a universal in re or ante rem, 
nor is the idea of a communicability of the essence or nature taken 
into account at all.
Quite evidently, in this work the Thomists felt no obligation to 
directly confront the Albertists’ position. This fact could be due to 
what H.G. Senger described, with reference to the late fifteenth-cen-
tury Albertist literature, as the progressive sunset of its “controversial 
character.”103 Moreover, the different approach can be related to the 
kind of text that the Thomists were commenting on, as well as with 
their employment of it. Indeed, the Quaestiones compendiosae, which 
drew on the doctrine of Henry of Gorkum, were composed, as we 
have seen, in order to introduce advanced students to first philoso-
phy. Gerard’s commentary on the De ente et essentia had probably 
been used in a similar way. In these works, the comparison with 
Albertist metaphysics was perceived as urgent. The Thomists’ logical 
texts such as the above-mentioned Copulata, in contrast, were not 
aimed at confronting metaphysical themes. Nor were the Albertists’ 
treatises on logic, at least with reference to the problem of universals, 
a direct polemical point of reference. Even if central views were still 
differentiated, there seems to have arisen a mixture among some 
reciprocal positions. In the Commentum in sex tractatus Summularum 
logicalium Petri Hispani composed possibly by Gerardus de Harder-
wijck (d. 1503), the most prominent Albertist in Cologne at the end 
of the fifteenth century, in the introduction to the second Treatise, a 
dubium was posed concerning “how many universals there are.”104 
The answer is typically Albertist: three universals are to be posited, 
101. After having elucidated a sixfold typology of universals (universale in distribuendo, 
in cognoscendo, in essendo, in causando, in repraesentando, in praedicando) Lambert concen-
trates on the last category, the universale in praedicando. It is concerning only this one, 
affirms the master, that one can distinguish three modes of consideration, i.e., as it is ante 
rem, in re and post rem. See Copulata omnium Tractatuum Petri Hyspani, f. K IVv-K Vr. 
102. Ibid., f. K Vr. 
103. See H.G. SENGER, “Albertismus? Überlegungen zur ‘via Alberti’ im 15. Jahrhun-
dert,” in: ZIMMERMANN (ed.), Albert der Große, pp. 217-236, here p. 235. 
104. Cf. GERARDUS DE HARDERWIJCK, Commentum in sex tractatus Summularum logi-
calium Petri Hispani, ed. U. ZELL, Köln 1492 (GW 10678), f. e VIIIvb: “Secundum 
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the universal ante rem being in its turn, according to Albert, two-
fold.105 Furthermore, the description of the universal in re is made 
“ad mentem Alberti.”106 But quite surprisingly, the exposition of the 
nature of the universal post rem reproduces in a quite literal way the 
position expressed in the Copulata produced in the Bursa Montana.107 
Thomist accounts of the universal in the mind seem thus to have 
become uniformly standardized at the end of the century. This must 
be regarded as a point of convergence with what was perceived, for 
example, by Gerard de Monte some decades earlier in his commen-
tary on the De ente et essentia. Surely, it constituted a shared position.
Finally, as far as the nominalist legacy at Cologne goes, the situa-
tion is somewhat complex. For although, as we have seen, the physi-
cal presence of nominalists at the University in the late fifteenth cen-
tury was negligible, nevertheless it is clear, as H. Braakhuis argues, 
that they nonetheless retained their influence in the Faculty of Arts 
through their textbooks, which continued to be used.108 Therefore 
the nominalist legacy and above all that of Buridan remained a very 
dubium est quottuplex est universale.” On the Albertist Gerard see for example TEWES, 
Die Bursen der Kölner Artisten-Fakultät, pp. 62-63, 378 ff. 
105. Ibid.: “Solutio: triplex, scilicet ante rem, in re et post rem. Universale ante rem 
est duplex: unum est ante rem natura et tempore simul, et aliud ante rem natura tantum. 
Universale ante rem natura et tempore simul non est aliud quam forma in lumine intel-
lectuali primae causae accepta […]. Ante rem natura tantum et non tempore est natura 
in esse fluentis principii accepta, praeveniens singularia […].”  
106. Ibid.: “Universale in re, quod alio nomine vocatur in essendo, est eadem forma, 
secundum quod est actu in pluribus individuis […].” Braakhuis noticed how the position 
of Gerard of Harderwijck on universals is reminiscent of that of Heymericus in the Trac-
tatus problematicus; see H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS, “School Philosophy and Philosophical 
Schools. The Semantic-Ontological Views in the Cologne Commentaries on Peter of 
Spain, and the ‘Wegestreit’,” in: A. ZIMMERMANN (ed.), Die Kölner Universität im 
Mittelalter, Berlin / New York 1989, pp. 1-18, here pp. 15-16. 
107. Ibid., f. e VIIIvb-f Ira: “Universale post rem, sive in praedicando, est eadem 
natura communis intentionaliter praesentata intellectui per abstractionem luminis intel-
lectus agentis […]. Ibi tamen considerandum est quod duplex est universale, scilicet uni-
versale in potentia et universale in actu. Universale in potentia est ipsa quidditas vel 
natura quae est in singulari vel particulari, cui non repugnat esse in alio singulari quantum 
de se est, licet repugnet sibi in quantum iam individuata. Et ista natura sic accepta voca-
tur universale in re, et est in potentia remota ad hoc ut praedicetur de multis. Sed uni-
versale in actu est ipsa natura seu quidditas denudata a conditionibus individuantibus. Et 
illa est in proxima potentia ut praedicetur de multis.” Also what follows in Harderwijck’s 
text – that is, the description of ‘forming’ the universal post rem – is formulated in the 
same manner as in the Thomistic Copulata.  
108. Ibid., p. 5. 
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real interlocutor for the Cologne Thomists when it came to matters 
concerning logic.109 Given this evidence, the focusing (e.g., in the 
Copulata written at the Bursa Montana) on the “complete” and 
“incomplete” nature of the universal in order to explain the relation-
ship between the universal in the mind and the nature individuated 
by material conditions, allowed Thomists to maintain a middle posi-
tion between that of the nominalists, on the one hand, and that of a 
more radical, ‘Platonic’ realism, on the other.110 In any case, the 
absence of any confrontation with the Albertists’ metaphysical 
critiques permitted them to affirm the intellectual character of the 
universal as such and to avoid any further discussion about the onto-
logical property of the nature or essence to which the intention of 
universality refers. The legitimating idea of its “potential universality” 
is here just taken for granted.
7. Concluding Remarks
This last position defended in Thomist logical texts is reminiscent of 
the one employed in some of the already mentioned pseudo-Thom-
istic treatises. A ‘moderate’ realism according to which the universal 
in the mind is an actual being, while the universal as instantiated in 
the extra-mental thing is merely a potentiality, was in some respects 
a vulgarization of Thomas’s doctrine on universals. So for example at 
the end of the fifteenth century the famous Erfurter nominalist, 
Bartholomeus de Usingen,111 in his Summa compendiaria totius logi-
cae, described the opinion of “beatus Thomas cum suis consectaneis” 
concerning the universal in being using the categories of act and 
potency.112 The same account was given by Johannes Parreudt, who 
expounded the position of the realist Thomatizantes using the 
very same words as those found in the Thomist Copulata.113 In all 
109. Cf. BRAAKHUIS, “School Philosophy and Philosophical Schools”. 
110. Ibid., p. 7. 
111. Cf. the bibliographical references in footnote 83. 
112. See BARTHOLOMEUS ARNOLDI DE USINGEN, Summa compendiaria totius logicae, 
ed. N. KEPLER, Basel 1507, f. c VIIv. The author claimed that Thomas admitted a com-
mon nature “secundum rationem considerandi tantum”, that is, a potentially universal 
common nature whose universality is actualized only in and by the mind. 
113. We can reasonably assume that Parreudt had a manuscript or maybe a printed 
exemplar of Lambert’s handbook, and used it as a kind of vulgarization of the Thomistic 
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probability, Bartholomeus and Johannes were familiar with the texts 
of Lambert and those of his pupils, in manuscript or probably even 
in printed form. From the point of view of the nominalists, Thomas 
and the Thomists maintained a middle way between the moderni on 
the one hand, and Scotus and his followers on the other. The collec-
tion of references utilized by Bartholomeus and Parreudt was not, 
primarily, taken from the De ente et essentia, but rather from other 
passages of Thomas, for example in his Scriptum super Sententiis, 
Book I, distinction 19,114 and in his lecture on Book VII of the 
Metaphysics.115 Nevertheless, this doctrine was to be regarded as com-
binable with the assertion of the De ente et essentia, where universality 
as such is recognized according to its being in the intellect. 
As we have seen, however, it was just this view — which in fact 
made Thomists closer to the nominalists — that was strongly ques-
tioned by the Albertists, both in Paris (with Johannes de Nova Domo) 
and especially in Cologne (with Heymericus de Campo). Moreover, it 
was precisely by departing from the De ente et essentia and by address-
ing the question about the existence of a threefold universal — which 
was as such external to the scope and to the treatment of the De ente 
et essentia itself — that Henry of Gorkum and Gerard de Monte found 
a way to incorporate the more radical realism of their rivals into 
Thomas’s doctrine. They adopted the notion of communicability, 
position. Parreudt summarizes the Thomists’ position as follows (JOHANNES PARREUDT, 
Textus veteris artis, f. a IIIv): “Modus ponendi Thomistarum est talis. Universale, quando 
capitur pro natura universali vel communi, sicut est humanitas, est duplex, scilicet in 
potentia et in actu. Universale in potentia est ipsa quidditas vel natura quae est in singu-
lari, cui non repugnat esse in alio singulari, quantum est de se, licet sibi repugnet inquan-
tum facta est propria huic singulari per principium individuantis. Et vocatur alio nomine 
universale incompletum vel fundamentaliter, et est in potentia remota ut praedicetur de 
pluribus. Universale autem in actu est ipsa natura denudata per intellectum a conditioni-
bus individuantibus, utpote a colore, figura et aliis appendiciis. Et tale vocatur universale 
completum, quia sibi conveniunt ea quae rationem perfecti universalis complent. Et est 
in potentia propinqua, ut praedicetur de pluribus. Et sic universale completum et for-
maliter fit ab intellectu agente, qui abstrahit conditionem individuantis, sed fundamen-
taliter et originaliter est in re.” As one can see, nearly the entire passage can be traced back 
to Lambert’s (and also to Gerard of Harderwijck’s) exposition.  
114. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, I, dist. 19, quaest. 5, 
art. 1, p. 486. Actually, Parreudt identifies the passage as corresponding to distinction 18 
of the Scriptum; see JOHANNES PARREUDT, Textus veteris artis, f. A IIIv.  
115. Cf. Thomas’s Sententia super Metaphysicam was quoted for example by JOHANNES 
PARREUDT, Textus veteris artis, f. A IIIv. 
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which the Albertists used in order to trace the flowing of the same 
universal essence to different kinds of beings, and employed it in a 
different meaning, assigning it to that nature to which the attribute of 
universality can be applied. Consequently they admitted a universal 
ante rem and in re, as long as this universal was taken to be a nature 
or an essence that could pertain to different beings. In so doing, the 
two Thomists attempted to forge — more rhetorically than substan-
tially — a shared terrain for the two currents in the realist via antiqua. 
The same strategy was pursued by Gerard in his Tractatus ostendens. 
In an effort to programmatically react to Heymericus’s critique and 
thus to grant Thomist science a real foundation in re, Gerard employed 
Thomas’s text in order to hint at the identity of the universal term or 
the objective content of intellection and the thing itself, and finally he 
tried to show that Albert had basically maintained the same doctrine.
In general, by reworking Thomas’s texts and using concepts that 
were foreign to them, Thomist masters stressed one or the other 
aspect of a somewhat vague doctrine for the sake of positioning them-
selves. In this sense, the incompleteness of Aquinas’s original reflec-
tion on universals implicitly provided his followers with the possibil-
ity of developing their own views, without renouncing any claims to 
superiority over those of their rivals’.
It is fair to assume that those nominalists who read Lambert and 
the Thomist logical Copulata had access also to the Quaestiones com-
pendiosae and to Gerard de Monte’s Commentary, as well as to his 
Tractatus ostendens. As has been shown in the literature, the quantity 
of printed works from the realist side in Cologne, both from Thom-
ists and from Albertists, was quite massive.116 Confronted with texts 
belonging to different genres and extensive in scope, late fifteenth-
century nominalists could then easily find quite divergent approaches 
to the same problem, not only between realists of different schools, 
but also within the very same realist school. The Cologne intellectual 
environment, with its strong split of the realists into two parties, 
could therefore be regarded as the centre where a manifold production 
of positions led to an indefinite multiplication of opinions. 
116. Cf. E. VOULLIÉME, Der Buchdruck Kölns bis zum Ende des fünfzehnten Jahrhun-
derts, Düsseldorf 1978. 
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Finally, it is perhaps necessary to say some words, in summary, 
about the Thomist strategy. Despite accusations of ambiguity, which 
were justifiably levelled against realists in general, and against Thom-
as’s followers in particular, it was the latter that regarded doctrinal 
and hermeneutical ‘unity’ and ‘concordance’ with the Albertists as an 
important objective. In fact, as has become clear, for the Cologne 
Thomists, expanding the already mentioned doctrinal ‘common 
ground’ in order to construct a unified opinion was a school strategy 
and a priority. One of the reasons for this concordistic attitude was 
almost certainly the will, on the part of Thomas’s fifteenth-century 
followers, to present the master’s doctrine, not only as superior, but 
also as the only one that could embrace, and indeed did embrace, the 
very core of the true Peripatetic tradition.117 As we have seen, the line 
adopted by the Bursa Montana during the fifteenth century was that 
of legitimating their master’s position as the most comprehensive one 
– that is, as the one which could reasonably make sense of the doc-
trines of both Albert and Thomas, and as the only one which could 
effectively silence the charge of division, mostly emanating from the 
nominalist side. 
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117. See my observations in “La quaestio ‘De salvatione Aristotelis’.” For the Thom-
ists, freeing the doctrine of Albert from its subsequent erroneous interpretations by the 
Albertists was intended to restore an harmonious doctrinal vein, according to the truest 
Peripatetic direction. What Rutten observes in relation to Petrus Nigri seems to fit this 
paradigm. Specifically, he notices that Nigri, in his Clypeus Thomistarum, criticized 
Albert’s positions, not by mentioning him by name, but only the Albertists. See RUTTEN, 
“Duae opiniones probabiles,” p. 131. 
